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More Than a Wing and a Prayer: Government Indemnification of 
the Commercial Space Launch Industry 
Timothy J. Brennan, Carolyn Kousky, and Molly Macauley 
Abstract 
Using rockets to launch communications satellites and other spacecraft poses risks to the 
uninvolved public, including persons and property under the flight path of the launch vehicle.  The federal 
government plays a pivotal technical role during the actual launch by carrying out certain risk-related 
procedures, thus causing third-party risk to be jointly produced by the company and the government.  In 
addition, under the Commercial Space Launch Act, the government partially indemnifies commercial 
launch companies for third-party damages. We compare the indemnification policy to optimal liability 
rules under public-private co-production of risk.  Under modest assumptions, shared liability created by 
the indemnification rules decreases the incentive of both parties to take care relative to the optimum.  If 
care were observable, it would be preferable for the government to fully indemnify companies that take 
due care. The role of the government as an agent for third parties may qualify these findings. 
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More Than a Wing and a Prayer: Government Indemnification of 
the Commercial Space Launch Industry 
Timothy J. Brennan, Carolyn Kousky, and Molly Macauley ∗ 
1. Introduction 
The federal government indemnifies many risks, including nuclear power accidents, 
terrorism attacks, and flood events.1  One justification for indemnification is the potential for 
catastrophic losses that would threaten insurers’ solvency and lead to premiums insureds would 
be unwilling or unable to pay (e.g., Grossman 1958).  Another justification for limiting liability 
is as an implicit subsidy in recognition of the positive externalities associated with the activity 
receiving (or prompted by) the indemnification (e.g., Lakdawalla and Zanjani 2005; 42 U.S.C. 
§2012(i) 19702).   
Both situations introduce moral hazard by creating a wedge between those taking the risk 
and those paying for it.  We examine a case where indemnification may be economically 
justified for a different reason—because the government establishing the indemnification rule is 
also co-producing the risk along with the private sector.  The specific setting we examine is 
commercial space launch.  Commercial companies launch satellites for TV, telephony, 
navigation, environmental monitoring, and many other services.3  The launch vehicle passes over 
                                                 
∗ Brennan is a professor of public policy and economics at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and 
Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC; Kousky is a Fellow, Resources for the Future; Macauley 
is a Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. Corresponding author: Carolyn Kousky, kousky@rff.org, 202-328-
5188.   
We thank Rene Ray and his colleagues at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for assistance in locating 
material and in their patience in helping us understand the FAA’s maximum probable loss calculation.  Background 
sections of our paper draw from Macauley’s participation in two FAA-sponsored studies (FAA 2002; Vedda 2006). 
Responsibility for errors and opinions rests with the authors. 
1 Many flood insurance policies are subsidized, leading to federal indemnification. Moreover, the program is not 
priced to cover catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Katrina, for which claims will likely be covered by public tax 
dollars (as supported by the Obama administration). 
2 The Price-Anderson Act limited the liability of the nuclear industry in the event of an accident. The stated goal of 
the act was to “protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy industry.” The social 
benefits of nuclear power were thought to justify the indemnification. 
3 Commercial space launches generally involve putting objects into orbit around the earth, rather than either flights 
beyond the earth’s orbit, such as to the moon or other planets, or suborbital “up and down” launches.  Proposed 
“space tourism” is very likely to begin with suborbital launches.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
2 
populated land for a period of time, during which its breakup or explosion could cause damage to 
private property and injury or death to the population below.  Production and ownership of the 
launch vehicle are private, but industry has little control over the actual launch, which is 
conducted by the Air Force.  In particular, the Air Force has final authority for terminating the 
launch if needed to protect third parties.  Thus, both the company and the Air Force contribute to 
the risk of third-party harm from a launch. 
The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) of 1984 directed the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to regulate commercial launch safety and establish a policy for sharing 
liability between the government and private sectors, including protecting the uninvolved public 
during launch. The FAA fashioned a three-layer approach to covering third-party claims from 
private launches.4  In the first layer, the launch company is responsible for third-party claims—
the lesser of either $500 million or the maximum private insurance available at a reasonable cost.  
In the second layer, the government indemnifies the launch provider and covers losses between 
$500 million and $1.5 billion.  Finally, claims above $1.5 billion revert to the company. 
Although the co-production of the risk suggests that government should bear some of the 
costs, partial indemnification of the launch company could still lead to moral hazard.  The launch 
company may take too little care before the launch in the production of the launch vehicle, since 
the government will be bearing some of the costs of an accident.  On the other hand, failure to 
indemnify the company could lead to moral hazard in the reverse direction, where the 
government takes too little care during the launch or in setting safety regulations.  Splitting the 
costs, as is currently done, also poses problems, in that the government may take too little care to 
avoid losses below the level at which it becomes liable.  The government may also be too quick 
to abort launches, since it is not responsible for the private costs to the company of loss of a 
satellite from an abort.   
To develop recommendations for liability and safety regulations in these situations, we 
model private sector care levels in response to various levels of government indemnification.  
We find that the current risk-sharing arrangement likely reduces both parties’ incentives to take 
due care.  Full government indemnification of the company for third-party damages, conditional 
on undertaking due care, would be preferable.  However, treating the government as a unified 
                                                 
4 P.L. 98-575 and extended in P.L. 108-428. The FAA guidelines creating the tiered approach are codified in 14 
CFR 440. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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decisionmaker may not be appropriate, since the Air Force may not feel responsible for federal 
tax dollars used to cover third-party losses.  Finally, the government may not act as a private 
party facing financial liability would, since it is not a principal but an agent subject to political 
influences from the launch industry, the public at risk of harm from errant launches, and 
taxpayers, who ultimately fund any payments made to victims of launch accidents.  
Determining optimal regulation and liability rules in this case of co-production of risk 
between private companies and the government is timely.  Congress will soon be revising the 
indemnification provisions of the CSLA, whose liability structure expires in 2009.  Our analysis 
will also be applicable to the development of regulations regarding commercial space 
transportation, where entrepreneurial efforts to provide public space rides are ongoing.  Our 
findings have implications for other cases of co-production of risk levels, as well.  One example 
is terrorism, where government policies, as well as private sector security measures, determine 
the risks of attacks on particular installations.  A second is federal flood insurance, where 
individuals choose where to locate, but the federal government may be able to change the 
likelihood and severity of harm through structural flood control measures. 
Following this introduction, the next section of the paper provides background on the 
launch industry, the CSLA provisions, and the critical role of the Air Force in terminating 
launches.  We then turn in Section III to our model of indemnification, extending familiar 
models of negligence to the case of commercial space launch.  We discuss the role of the 
government as “last actor” in aborting a space launch and examine the complexities of 
government as agent, not principal. Section IV concludes.   
2. Background 
2.1 The Market 
Commercial space transportation companies now operate in almost every spacefaring 
nation, including the United States, Russia, Japan, China, India, Israel, and Europe.  The 
companies serve a global market and offer a range of sizes of launch vehicles to accommodate 
differences in the sizes of payloads.  Small vehicles launch navigation and small environmental 
monitoring satellites into low-altitude orbits, and launchers with three or four times more 
powerful thrust are used for larger satellites destined for higher-altitude orbits.  These satellites 
supply telephony, cable and direct broadcast satellite television, data transmission, weather 
monitoring, banking transactions, and other services.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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Table 1 illustrates the size of the market based on the number of launches and the amount 
of revenue received for launch services for the United States and the rest of the world during the 
past decade.  The number of launches varies widely each year as satellites die and are replaced 
and as new satellites are added in response to increasing demand, but has averaged around 22 
annually.  The prices of launches range from about $10 million for a very small payload destined 
for a low orbit to $140 million or more for large, high-altitude payloads.  Revenue also varies but 
has averaged about $1.6 billion yearly over the past decade.  
Table 1. Commercial Launches and Launch Revenue, 1999–2009 











U.S. Rest  of  World 
1999  14  (15)  22  (21)  $763  (806)  $1,454  (1412) 
2000  10  (12)  24  (22)  708  (836)  2,067  (1940) 
2001  5    (6)  11  (10)  341  (426)  1,128  (1043) 
2002  6    (7)  18  (17)  418  (456)  1,546  (1509) 
2003  8    (9)  8    (7)  529  (642)  663    (551) 
2004  9  (11)  6    (4)  600  (713)  450    (338) 
2005  1    (3)  17  (15)  70    (210)  1,117  (977) 
2006  7    (9)  13  (11)  490  (665)  926    (751) 
2007  4    (5)  18  (17)  220  (255)  1,317  (1282) 
2008  11  (14)  14  (11)  674  (912)  1,124  (887) 
2009a  9  (12)  8    (5)  504  (664)  462    (302) 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, Annual Launch Reports, various years 
Notes:  aprojected as of 12/2008 
2.2 The Hand of Government 
U.S. government involvement in commercial space transportation is extensive, reflecting 
the industry’s military heritage and the national security applications of the technology.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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Government is sometimes a customer in the space transportation market, although the liability 
rules we study here do not pertain in these cases, since government self-insures for launches of 
government satellites.  Government funds most industry R&D, 5 serves as “gatekeeper” in 
operating the launch ranges, sets and enforces safety regulations, and controls munitions-related 
technology exports. 
In the United States, ownership of launch vehicle manufacturing and production is 
private.  Vehicles are supplied under contract to government and commercial customers (with the 
exception of the space shuttle, which is wholly government owned and operated).  In other 
countries, facilities are owned and operated exclusively by government or involve a mix of 
public and private arrangements, often subsidized.  Governments self-insure in those cases of 
government ownership.  In mixed public and private arrangements, some governments provide 
partial indemnification in a variety of ways (FAA 2002; Vedda 2006).  These arrangements in 
other countries have led U.S. industry to argue for government subsidies in the form of 
indemnification to “level the playing field,” given the state ownership or co-ownership of launch 
vehicles in other countries and their self-insurance and partial indemnification by the public 
sector.  
2.3 The Liability Requirements 
The focus of this paper is on the optimal liability rules for third-party losses from 
commercial space launches.6  Third-party risks arise mainly when the vehicle passes over 
occupied land.  Explosion or breakup of the vehicle could cause property damage or injury or 
fatalities to those within the flight path or the range of jettisoned boosters, casings, and other 
debris.  In addition, aircraft and ships are given advanced notification and are restricted from 
travel within the launch vicinity, typically for several hours before the launch.7   
                                                 
5 However, some of the newest rockets now being designed and tested for space tourism are privately financed. 
SpaceShipOne was developed by the British industrialist Richard Branson and other private investors in pursuit of 
the Ansari X-Prize, SpaceShipTwo is now under development, and Falcon is under development by Paypal founder 
Elon Musk. 
6 Risks to government property and to personnel on the launch range are separately addressed by the FAA (see note 
9, below). Satellite owners obtain additional insurance for successful operation of their satellites once the spacecraft 
are in orbit.  This insurance is not regulated and, because it does not involve harms to third parties, is not our focus 
here. Government-owned satellite operations, once the satellites are in orbit, are self-insured by taxpayers.  
7 The duration of the restrictions varies based on the launch “window.”  Launches are notoriously delayed and 
postponed, leading to a large social cost of time lost by ships and aircraft.  Analysis of this aspect of space launches 
is a worthy topic for additional study. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
6 
Table 2 describes the liability requirements outlined in the CSLA, which take the form of 
a three-tiered allocation of potential financial losses between the company and the government.  
The first tier deals with losses below a limit intended to represent those losses with greatest 
likelihood of occurrence.  This is the maximum probable loss (MPL), established by the FAA for 
each launch based on the vehicle’s past performance (“failure probability”) and the proximity of 
the launch flight trajectory to population and other property (“expected loss”).8  The MPL 
assessment is generally agreed to give significant weight to public safety.9 To date, there have 
been no third-party claims in the United States due to space launch accidents.  Third parties in 
other countries have not fared as well. For example, news reports document large numbers of 
citizens killed when rockets veered off course in China during the 1990s, although the Chinese 
government disputes the number of fatalities.  
In practice, the MPL is calculated under two settings.10  For both, the regulator, here the 
FAA, first determines a threshold probability below which losses are deemed to be negligible.  
For third-party losses, that likelihood has been set at 1 in 10 million.  The regulator then 
identifies accident scenarios.  In the first setting, where none of the scenarios have a likelihood of 
exceeding the threshold probability, the regulator ranks scenarios in order of loss that would 
                                                 
8 The government’s “probabilistic hazard analysis” estimates risks based on probabilities as a function of elapsed 
time into the mission, characteristics of the vehicle, local weather conditions, and the surrounding population 
distribution (see Research Triangle Institute, 1995). The values are expressed as a “casualty expectation,” defined as 
Ec = ΣPi(AHi/Ai)Ni . The casualty expectation, Ec , is the sum over the number of people, N, in hazard area AHi (where 
“lethal” debris impacts can occur).  The area A is partitioned into I subsets of with areas Ai, i = 1, …I; N = ΣNi, 
where Ni is the number of people in area i.  The “fragment impact probability density,” Pi , is determined by 
characteristics and previous performance of the launch vehicle, weather, and the planned launch trajectory. The 
casualty expectation is not to exceed 30 x 10
-6. The statistical value of life is used to convert this risk into monetary 
values, based on estimates established by the US Department of Transportation for its safety regulation of other 
transport modes. 
9See Federal Aviation Administration (2000); also, in reviewing the possibility of third-party accidents involving 
space launch, the investigating board for the accident involving the space shuttle Columbia pointed out the 
“flawless” public safety record of US space flight, noting that hundreds of US space launches have taken place 
without injury to the public (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 214). The report noted that falling debris 
from aviation killed about eight people per year during 1964 and 1999; the probability of a US resident’s being 
killed by aircraft debris—a category known as “groundling” fatalities—is less than one in a million over a 70-year 
lifetime (214).The report states further that although comparisons with aviation accidents are difficult given the 
small number of space flights compared with aircraft flights and government space flight safety standards (emphasis 
added), “it is unlikely that US space flights will produce many, if any, public injuries in the coming years,” given the 
procedures of US space launch range commanders and other government range personnel (214). 
10 The characterizations here are our understandings based on conversations with FAA staff, but responsibility for 
their accuracy remains ours. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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occur, and then sets the MPL as that for the scenario for which the probability of larger losses is, 
in the aggregate, less than 1 in 10 million.  In the second setting, where some of the scenarios 
have a likelihood of exceeding the threshold probability, the regulator sets the MPL as the largest 
loss among the set of those scenarios, reflecting an assumption that the probability of a loss is 
inversely related to its magnitude.  The chance that a loss will exceed the MPL is no greater than 
but could be as large as the multiple of the threshold probability times the number of scenarios 
where the chance of a loss is less than the threshold probability.  However, the number of 
excluded scenarios in the current methods used to assess launch risk is small.  
Under the indemnification rules, the FAA limits third-party liability to the lesser of the 
MPL and “the maximum amount of insurance available on the world market at reasonable 
cost.”11  The FAA has set an effective ceiling on liability under these rules at $500 million, 
effectively implying an expectation that the MPL for any given launch will be less than that.12  
Under Tier I, as described in Table 2, the launch company is responsible for losses below the 
MPL, through either insurance or some other demonstration of financial responsibility (this 
demonstration is enforced as a licensing requirement).  At this juncture, we can only speculate as 
to why this insurance may not be available. The current MPL appears to be set so high that the 
probability of damages’ falling into the government’s layer of liability is almost negligible.  
When the probability that losses will exceed the MPL is, at most, 1 in 10 million, the expected 
value of indemnification up to $1.5 billion is only $150.  In cases where there are multiple 
scenarios above the MPL, the exposure of the launch company could be multiples of $150, but 
conversations with the FAA have indicated that there are very few such scenarios for any given 
launch. 
Consequently, the expected value of the indemnification appears minimal compared with 
the costs of the launch, making the (political) demand by the launch industry for indemnification 
puzzling.  Explanations include either extreme risk aversion against catastrophic outcomes on the 
part of the companies or their belief that the risks are orders of magnitude larger than 
                                                 
11 In addition, an MPL is estimated for damages to government property on the launch range. The company’s 
liability is limited to the MPL provided it does not exceed the lesser of $100 million or the maximum amount of 
insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost.  Since our focus is on third-party harms, we ignore this 
here, although we note that safety investments induced by these liability rules are likely to affect the magnitude of 
the risks faced by third parties. 
12 The largest MPL calculated so far by the FAA for a commercial launch is $264 million; see 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/licenses_permits/media/mplsum.pdf. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
8 
government estimates imply.  There may be good reason for the latter.  Between 1999 and 2009, 
the years for which we have data, there have only been 84 commercial launches in the United 
States, none causing third-party damage.  Even if one includes government launches, there would 
still be far too little empirical evidence to estimate accident probabilities as small as 1 in 10 
million.  
The alleged unavailability of insurance is also puzzling. At the time of the original 
legislation, global insurance markets were in a downturn (more on this below), but this would 
not explain why the concern continues.  One possibility is that the lack of data on accidents and 
their correlates makes insurers unable to hedge the risk, and thus makes them no less risk averse 
than the launch companies themselves.  For losses whose probability or magnitude is unknown, 
insurers have been found to charge an “ambiguity premium” that could make premiums higher, 
again, than insureds will pay (Kunreuther and Hogarth 1992).  This may explain the lack of 
affordable terrorism insurance after 9/11 (Kunreuther 2022).  A second possibility is that the 
price may not be “reasonable” because companies may choose a small likelihood of bankruptcy 
over paying the cost of insurance against these high losses.  In focusing on the effects of the 
indemnification rule itself, we do not address the theoretical or empirical veracity of these 
claims.   
Table 2. U.S. Liability-Sharing Regime for Commercial Space Transportation  
(49 USC Subtitle IX, Chapter 701)\ 
Structure    Liability 
Tier I: Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)-Based Financial 
Responsibility Requirements  
 
FAA-determined MPL, not to exceed lesser of $0.5 billion for 
third-party liablity, or maximum available on world market at 
reasonable cost   
→  Licensee (commercial space 
transportation supplier)  
Tier II: Indemnification (Government Payment of Claims) 
 
Successful third-party claims between MPL (or $0.5 billion) 
and $1.5 billion (1988 dollars; to be adjusted for inflation at 
time of claim) 
 
→  Government, subject to 
congressional appropriations; 
claims waived for government 
property damage  
Tier III: Above MPL-Based Insurance plus Indemnification 
 
Greater than $1.5 billion (1988 dollars; to be adjusted for 
inflation at time of claim) 
→  Licensee (commercial space 
transportation supplier)  
 Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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In Tier II, known as the indemnification provision, the government is liable for claims 
that exceed the MPL.  The Tier II government liability is capped at $1.5 billion ($1988) for third 
parties (if there is a claim, the amount is to be adjusted for inflation since 1988.13  The 
government will waive claims exceeding the Tier I amount for government property damage.  In 
Tier III, financial responsibility for third-party liability above the inflation-adjusted $1.5 billion 
reverts to the licensee.  Because the likelihood of harms in this tier is small, and including it only 
complicates the analysis without providing significant additional insights into the design of 
optimal liability rules in this context, we do not include Tier III in the models below. 
2.4 Legislative Background  
Before turning to analysis of the liability regime, we first examine the legislative record 
for clues as to why the choice was made for government intervention in the launch industry in 
general, and for risk sharing through indemnification in particular.  We then provide details 
about the unique role of the U.S. Air Force in actual implementation of safety procedures 
associated with a launch.  It is through this role that the government influences the risk of third-
party damages from launches, thus co-producing the risk with the launch company.   
Prior to 1986, all launches, including commercial payloads, were carried out by 
government, which self-insured against third-party damages.  Government would contract with 
the launch company on behalf of the payload owner and, under the Space Act of 1958, assume 
all third-party launch liability risk of its contractors (i.e., the launch companies).  Owners of the 
satellites typically insured the payload itself in the event of its failure to operate once in orbit. 
During 1987 and 1988, Congress sought to transform the industry into a commercial 
business.  Hearings addressed how best to assist U.S. launch companies in competing with 
Europe, China, and the Soviet Union, whose space launch programs were by then well 
developed.  Because U.S. companies had launched very few commercial payloads, the hearings 
characterized the sector as a new industry requiring government support to develop.  Proposals 
                                                 
13 Any government payments are subject to congressional appropriation; presumably, the launch company would be 
liable if Congress does not appropriate funds.  We expect, however, that congressional appropriation would 
probably be forthcoming, for reasons similar to that of Litan (2006). In a study of government’s role in insurance 
after events such as Hurricane Katrina, he points out that “history has demonstrated time after time that when 
disaster strikes, especially mega-disasters, governments will not sit idly by and let injured, but privately uninsured or 
underinsured people suffer. Government has provided disaster aid to these individuals in the past and always will do 
so in the future.”   Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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advanced during the hearings ranged from direct subsidies to U.S. launch companies to implicit 
subsidies by way of government launch indemnification.14   
The executive branch and some members of Congress opposed direct subsidies but were 
open to alternatives.  Industry was asking for help in light of international competition, and the 
indemnification option appeared to be a compromise. Assistance was further motivated by 
testimony of the insurance industry.  The industry had insured several commercial payloads that 
had been destroyed in rocket launch failures during 1983–1985 as well as in the space shuttle 
Challenger accident (the Challenger was carrying a large commercial satellite).  It was the 
practice of insurers to write satellite policies under regular property-casualty lines of business, 
and payouts of satellite losses were unexpectedly high.  Insurers further testified that as a result 
of these losses, some underwriters had exited the satellite market; others declared that they 
lacked adequate capacity for any kind of insurance and that additional demands from the launch 
industry could be difficult to supply at “reasonable rates” (U.S. Congress 1988b). 
At the same time, those seeking insurance faced an overall worldwide slump in the 
insurance industry (see testimony by insurers at hearings reported in U.S. Congress 1988a, 
1988b).  A congressional report summarized these concerns by noting that “the liability 
insurance industry went through the worst cyclical downturn in the industry’s history in the mid 
1980s as evidenced by huge rate increases, mass cancellation of coverage, and entire lines of 
insurance virtually unavailable at any price.”15  In a subsequent analysis, a report for the U.S. 
Department of Transportation depicted an insurance industry in malaise, stating that a 
“widespread crisis affected the entire property/casualty market and was manifested in an increase 
in liability insurance rates, lack of cover in some areas, and the potential for large jury verdicts” 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 2002).  
In light of these findings, Congress became concerned that unless the government agreed 
to become more directly involved in resolving insurance issues, including limiting the industry’s 
                                                 
14 Launch companies also sought subsidies as a means of redressing pre-emption of their business in the early years 
of the space shuttle program, during which government required all commercial satellites to use the shuttle fleet as a 
means of keeping the shuttle in business (see Toman and Macauley 1989).  
15 Dionne and Harrington (1992) discuss this mid-1980s liability insurance “crisis” in the context of related research 
on insurance price volatility and underwriting cycles. This period was also during the heyday of proposed tort 
reform. The report noted that “industry critics have charged that these losses largely resulted from self-destructive 
insurer management actions involving the long-term pricing of risk below cost. Insurers say the losses resulted 
primarily from claims arising from a liberalized tort law system” (5).  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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potential liability, a U.S. launch services industry would fail to develop (U.S. Congress 1988a, 
1).  Previous legislation, the Commercial Space Launch Act in 1984, had already called for some 
type of shared government and industry insurance, and in 1988 Congress passed the Commercial 
Space Launch Amendments, setting forth the three-tiered regime.  In recognition of the cyclical 
nature of insurance markets and the desire to establish a commercially viable launch industry, the 
provision was to expire in five years.  At that time, Congress and the administration were to 
“revisit the need for an extension based upon launch and insurance industry developments and 
related market conditions.”  Congress has subsequently extended the provisions in 1999, 2000, 
and 2004; they come up for reauthorization again in 2009.16  
Such extensions are not unusual.  Once involved in subsidizing or indemnifying a risk, 
government has found it very difficult to withdraw that support.  The Price-Anderson Act, passed 
in 1957, provides partial indemnification of the nuclear industry in the event of an accident.  It 
was set to expire in 10 years, after which time it was thought private insurance could take over.  
The program has now been renewed five times and is currently set to expire in 2025.  Similarly, 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, a federal backstop on terrorism claims, was passed in 2002 
and intended to be temporary while the private market for terrorism insurance was reestablished.  
It has since been extended in 2005 and 2007 and is currently set to expire in 2014.  This raises 
the question of whether it is simply that subsidies are difficult to take away after political support 
for them is created, or whether it was a mistake to think that private insurance could ever develop 
for risks where losses can be truly catastrophic.   
2.5 The Air Force on the Trigger  
The legislative record does not mention another, and in our view, more justifiable role for 
government risk sharing. Once a launch vehicle is manufactured and shipped to the launch range, 
industry has very little control over the launch itself.  With few exceptions, launch ranges are 
owned by the government and operated by the U.S. Air Force.  Most commercial launches take 
place at two Air Force–operated ranges, in Florida and California.  For several minutes during 
launch, the vehicle passes at some time over occupied land.  Launches from the east coast facility 
pass not only over the Florida coast but also over Africa; vehicles launched from the west coast 
                                                 
16 The extensions were contained in the 1999 Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development 
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, the 2000 Commercial Space Transportation Competitiveness Act, 
and the 2004 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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facility pass over portions of the southwestern US, southern Argentina, and Chile.  As stated 
earlier, third-party risks are to property and populated areas within the flight path and within 
range of jettisoned boosters, casings, and other debris, as well as within a larger area in which 
accidental explosions and breakups of the vehicle could occur; aircraft and ships are given 
advance notification restricting them from swaths of area within the launch vicinity.   
The most-often discussed element of managing a launch to avoid third-party damages is 
the flight termination system (FTS), which consists of explosive or other disabling equipment 
installed in the rocket and remotely operated on command by the launch managers.  By enabling 
destruction of an errant vehicle before its debris can be dispersed off-range, the system is the 
principal means of controlling most risks associated with the launch.  Flight termination, as well 
as control of other public risks from jettisoned stages and hardware prior to orbital insertion, are 
a “range responsibility” and thus controlled by Air Force range safety personnel rather than the 
launch vehicle supplier.   
The guidance for range operation defines as the principal mission “the protection of life 
and property both off and on-site at the launch facility” (FAA 1995, 2-6) Yet, “in keeping with 
that objective, the range must not be negligent, nor impose undue restrictions on launch 
conditions, that could result in a high probability of a good vehicle being destroyed.”  Hence, 
each launch is a decision that balances “minimization of the probability of terminating a ‘good’ 
flight, and simultaneous minimization of the potential risk due to a malfunctioning vehicle” 
(FAA 1995, 2-6).  A variety of technical characteristics and operational actions can reduce the 
risk to third parties; an example is the width of the “abort lines,” the geographic swath within 
which the launch vehicle travels before it becomes “errant” and a candidate for termination.  The 
FAA points out that narrower swaths “decrease the overall launch risk but increase the 
probability of aborting a good vehicle. Considering the very high value of many of the launch 
vehicles and their payloads, tight abort lines put additional pressure on the range safety officials 
who must decide on an active destruct command” (FAA 1995, 2-9).  
3. A Model of Indemnification 
As noted above, the maximum probable loss (MPL) cutoff point for damages below 
which the government does not indemnify the launch company can be thought of as akin to a 
deductible in an insurance plan offered by the government to the launch company. The 
theoretical and practical rationale for deductibles is well known: to mitigate ex post moral hazard 
(Raviv 1992; Pauly 1968).  In addition, under some conditions, deductibles can mitigate the Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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effects of adverse selection by creating the potential for separating clients with ex ante high risk 
from those with low risk (Raviv 1992).   
However, that analogy has limited utility here.  With the extensive regulatory structure 
surrounding launches, it is not clear that there is asymmetric information, i.e., that the 
government knows less about the risk of a launch than the launch company.  Because the launch 
company is not actually purchasing insurance from the government, the potential for separating 
high-risk from low-risk launches is not translated into a menu of insurance options with high 
deductibles and low premiums, appealing to low-risk launch companies, and low-deductible, 
high-premium policies that high-risk launch companies would prefer.  In addition, the launch 
vehicle companies are themselves required to obtain private insurance, thus undercutting any 
potential gains from countering moral hazard (assuming premiums cannot be varied in response 
to care levels) and separating high-risk from low-risk launches.   
Of more central interest here is that the nominal insurer or indemnifier, the government, 
also plays a role in determining the risk.  As already described above, it may do this by taking 
care prior to the launch and taking actions to limit the likelihood and scope of an accident.  
Consequently, in evaluating the structure of the government’s indemnification policy, we 
determine how it affects the level of care that both the launch company and the government 
would take.  We do so first by building on familiar models of negligence (Brown 1973; Cooter 
and Ulen 2000) to identify optimal rules and then show how the current indemnification policy 
leads at least one party and perhaps both to underprovide care.   
We then discuss how the model might be affected by recognizing two special aspects of 
the government’s role.  First, because the government is the last actor, in that as the entity that 
oversees the launch, it makes the final determination whether to abort a launch or to destroy a 
rocket taking an errant flight path, we discuss how choosing care levels sequentially instead of 
simultaneously would alter our results.  A second is recognizing that the government is not a 
principal.  As a government entity, any payments it might make as the indemnifier, were an 
accident to exceed the MPL, come from the taxpayers, not from itself.  Thus the government 
here—a complex combination of entities including the Air Force, FAA, NASA, and Congress—
is an agent that acts on behalf of the launch company, which wants missions to be successful, 
third parties at risk, who want to be protected, and taxpayers, who could be on the hook for Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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payments above the MPL.  These factors could affect the prediction from the model below—that 
because they are not liable for losses below the MPL, the government would take too little care.17 
3.1 The Model 
With that as backdrop, consider the following model of choice of care by the government 
(cG) and by the launch company (cL).  The levels of care are assumed to be chosen 
simultaneously (before observing the other’s) and one-dimensional (neglecting how different 
types of care affect different aspects of accident risk).  These levels of care affect the probability 
distribution f over sizes of third-party damages x, such that the distribution is f(x, cL, cG), where it 
satisfies the general definition of a frequency distribution:  
   ∫
∞
0
) , , ( dx c c x f G L  = 1.18 
The costs of care are characterized in money terms at a dollar per unit, so the marginal 
cost of care is a dollar; the differential effects of care on risk are built into the function f.  The 




) , , ( dx c c x xf G L . (1) 
Ignoring risk aversion for simplicity,19 the social optimum is to minimize the sum of the 
expected harm and the costs of care, 
   ∫
∞
0
) , , ( dx c c x xf G L  + cL + cG.   (2) 
                                                 
17 Brennan and Boyd (2006) discuss how these factors affect regulatory decision making, in the context of 
justifications for compensation for regulatory takings. 
18 In practice, this distribution could be discontinuous with a point mass at 0, where more care could increase the 
chance that there would be an accident with no damage or, equivalent for our purposes, no accident at all.  Since that 
outcome can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a continuous distribution with high values at very low levels of 
harm, we can apply this definition without appreciable loss of generality. 
19 One cannot ignore risk aversion in examining the indemnification structure as an insurance policy, since the 
motivation for purchasing insurance is for those with relatively high risk aversion to pay those with less or no risk 
aversion to take the risk.  Here, however, we are modeling incentives to take care, and assuming risk neutrality most 
cleanly allows us to illustrate the effects of the indemnification policy on those incentives. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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) , , ( dx c c x xf G L G  + 1 = 0,  (4) 
where fI is the derivative of the marginal probability with respect to changes in care level cI.  We 
assume that increasing care reduces expected harm, i.e., that both integrals in the above 
expressions are negative.20  Let cL* and cG* be the optimal levels of care defined by (3) and (4). 
A number of assumptions, which may not precisely hold in practice, are useful.  The first 
is that fGL < 0.  In this sense, cL and cG are substitutes; the more care one party practices, the less 
will the other party’s care reduce the chance of an accident.  This implies that the reaction 
functions cL(cQ) defined by (3) and cG(cL) defined by (4) are decreasing in their arguments.  To 
ensure an equilibrium, we assume they look as shown in Figure 1. 










                                                 
20 We also assume second-order conditions necessary to ensure a unique maximum for a launch, i.e., that the 
marginal effect of added care on reducing risk is positive, or in other words, that the change in expected harm 
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These optimal levels of care can be achieved through negligence rules incorporating an 
efficient due care standard.  Here, for example, a rule would say that if the launch company 
exercises care level cL*, it is not liable for any damages, even those below the MPL; if it does not 
take due care, it is fully liable.  The government would then choose cG* in response, as it now 
bears the residual harm and thus would act as if it is minimizing total expected harm and care 
costs as given in (4), taking cL* as given (Brown 1973).  In this context, an appropriate policy at 
least in theory would be for the government to fully indemnify launch vehicle companies that 
exercise due care, and hold them liable if it is discovered that they fail to meet that standard.  
This policy would be feasible only if the government could accurately observe care levels of the 
launch company. If an ex post review led to an erroneous conclusion that the launch company 
had failed to exercise due care, this policy would fail to be optimal.  It is worth noting that if care 
levels are observable, allowing this type of policy, then presumably private insurance companies 
could also observe care levels of the launch company and adjust premiums accordingly, thus 
making possible the use of Tier I as a deterrent to moral hazard.  
We can now examine how the current indemnification policy changes the care choices, 
by seeing how it would affect the location of these reaction curves.  Let M be the maximum 
probable loss (MPL) as described above, below which the launch company is liable (although 
insured) and above which the government bears the cost.  As stated earlier, for ease of 
exposition, because relevant likelihoods are advertised to be insignificant, and recognizing the 
possibility that launch companies might be judgment proof for damages above the upper limit 
because of bankruptcy regulations, we ignore here the upper bound of damages that the 
government will indemnify, and restrict our attention to the effect of M.   
With M in place, the launch vehicle company and the government, respectively, want to 
minimize the sum of their expected damages and costs of care: 
 Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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    ∫
M
G L dx c c x xf
0





G L dx c c x f M x ) , , ( ] [  + cG. (6) 
In general, both the launch company and the government will want to take some care, the former 
to avoid costs that fall below M, the latter to avoid payments for accidents with costs above M.  
The optimization conditions are, respectively, 
  ∫
M
G L L dx c c x xf
0





G L G dx c c x f M x ) , , ( ] [  + 1 = 0.  (8) 
Consider first the launch company.  For any level of care by the government, the launch 
company will want to cut back care if the left-hand side of (7)—the sum of marginal expected 




G L L dx c c x xf ) , , (  < 0.  (9) 
This condition means that exercising more care by the launch company reduces the expected 
harm from those accidents where the cost would exceed the MPL.  This need not hold if the 
launch company is exercising efficient care, as specified by (3)—one can conjure up numerical 
scenarios where the launch company acts efficiently, but increasing care increases the expected 
                                                 
21 The indemnification rules require launch companies to insure up to M or prove they could cover losses 
themselves. Because of moral hazard, if the launch companies insure, this could lead to their taking suboptimal care 
if their insurers cannot monitor care and make reimbursement of claims contingent on care.  As Shavell (1982) has 
shown, when compensation covers losses and restores third parties to their pre-accident level of well-being, liability 
insurance will increase overall economic welfare, even if it leads to suboptimal care, because both the insurer and 
the insured are better off if the latter can buy liability insurance at a price at which the former will offer it, and third 
parties, because they are compensated, are no worse off.  However, if the losses cannot be compensated ex post, loss 
of life being the obvious example, then liability insurance can reduce overall economic welfare by inducing 
suboptimal care without compensating benefit to third parties. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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harm from accidents above the MPL if the expected harm from accidents below the MPL—the 
integral in (7)—is sufficiently negative.  However, it seems reasonable that optimal care by the 
launch company would reduce the expected harm from high-cost accidents, or at least not 
increase it.  Thus, the indemnification rule would shift down the reaction function cL(cG) given in 
Figure 1.  If the launch company’s care has no effect on the likelihood of accidents above the 
MPL, then the reaction curve will remain as in Figure 1; it will not shift down.   
We now turn to the government.  For any level of care by the launch company, the 
government would reduce care below the socially optimal reaction curve if, at the level defined 
by (4), it finds that (8) is positive, i.e., that reducing care would reduce the sum of the expected 






G L G G L G dx c c x f M dx c c x xf
0
) , , ( ) , , (  < 0.  (10) 
The first integral above is the effect of government care on reducing expected harm for accidents 
with harm below M, the MPL.  This would be negative if government care makes that expected 
harm less likely.  Under the indemnification rule, the government bears none of this harm, so it 
would not take any such reductions in expected harm into account.  The second integral is M, the 
harm borne by the launch vehicle company for accidents with harm above M, times the chance 
that an accident would lead to harm above the MPL. 
If this sum is negative, as was the difference for the launch company, it implies reduced 
care and a downward shift in the government’s care reaction function.  This will hold with an 
assumption similar to but not quite the same as that which implies a reduction in launch company 
care, holding the government’s care constant.  To get a similar result for government care, we 





G L G dx c c x f ) , , (  < 0.  (11) 
If so,  
  ∫
M
G L G dx c c x f
0
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This follows because the general property of a frequency distribution, 
   ∫
∞
0





) , , ( dx c c x f G L G  = 0. 
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0
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 =  ∫
∞
0
) , , ( dx c c x f M G L G  
 =  0, 
as just shown.  Consequently, the expression in (10) is negative, hence the reaction curve cG(cL) 
in Figure 1 will shift down as well. 
With these results, one can use Figure 1 to illustrate the effect of the indemnification rule 
on care.  Specifically, we can show that the rule leads to suboptimal care in the aggregate, with at 
least one and possible both parties exercising less care than in the optimum.  That the care is 
suboptimal in the aggregate follows from the result immediately above, that the government will 
reduce its level of care given the choice of the launch company, in particular at cL*.  That both 
might reduce care is illustrated by Figure 2, where the dotted lines represent the original reaction 
curves and the solid lines new curves under the indemnification rule; cL° and cG° represent the 
choices under the indemnification rule. 
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It is possible that one party would increase care in response to the reduced care of the 
other.  For example, suppose that the launch company’s care has no effect on the likelihood of 
harms above the MPL, such that its reaction curve does not shift down. The resulting 
simultaneous care choices are described in Figure 3. 
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In this scenario, the rule reduces the care the government would take.  To make up for that care 
because the levels of care are substitutes, and because its overall incentives do not change, the 
launch company increases its care in response. 
3.2 Some Complications 
As noted above, two other aspects of the current liability arrangement for commercial 
launches merit mention.  First, care choices may be sequential rather than simultaneous.  
Suppose cL and cG remain substitutes, and that cG is chosen after the effects of cL are observed.  
From the perspective of efficient choices of care, in this case, one would want the government to 
be fully liable after observing cL, so that it fully considers the effect of its care decisions on 
harm.22  Such an efficient liability rule gives the reaction function cG(cL) defined implicitly by 
(4).  Knowing this liability rule, however, the launch company would have no incentive to take 
care to avoid third-party losses.23  To get the launch company to take appropriate care, one could 
hold it liable for the costs of the care the government has to take to avoid third-party losses when 
it has to act in response to the launch company’s choice of care. 
Our analysis did not consider the effect on care levels of private losses to the launch 
company, such as destruction of a satellite if something goes wrong at the launch, or loss of 
reputation and thus business should a launch failure be deemed the company’s fault.  Care taken 
to reduce these private damages could also reduce risks to third parties.  If this is the case, it is 
possible that the optimal care level to reduce private damages provides excessive third-party 
care, and thus third-party care levels will not be influenced by liability rules, since the level of 
care is being determined instead by the risk of private damages.  Of course, what level of care 
will be taken to reduce private damages will depend on the availability of private insurance 
(including coverage and deductible levels), as well as whether premiums vary in response to care 
levels.   
A final point to make involves the characterization of the government.  This model 
assumes that the government acts like a private party in two respects: it treats any liability and 
                                                 
22 This analysis draws from Wittman (1981). 
23 It, of course, would have incentive to take care to avoid losses of its rocket if the government had to exercise care 
by aborting a mission that was going badly.  In this setting, the launch company would bear the risk of that loss 
because it is required to release the government from any liability to its own property and personnel resulting from 
launches (14 CFR 440).   Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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care expenditure the government would have to make as a cost, and it posits no other interest for 
the government in the matter beyond that payment.  Neither assumption need be valid because 
the government is not a principal but an agent.  For the first, the money the government pays out 
belongs to the taxpayers, not to itself.  The extent to which the government treats liability and 
care cost as something to be minimized depends on the strength of political clout the taxpayers 
exercise over the government’s decisions regarding how it handles rocket launches.   
In addition, the government may care about harm not merely or even primarily because 
of a liability payment but because any harm that takes place could reduce political support.  
Treating the government as an agent, we can assume that its actions are based on the welfare of 
its multiple principles—the launch company and its customers, third parties who would be 
harmed in an accident, and taxpayers who would have to pay for damages—weighted by the 
political clout of each.24  If the third parties have disproportionate political clout, e.g., because 
their legislative representative has disproportionate influence over the specific agency’s 
appropriations or appointments or the government believes the public outcry following damage 
to third parties would be enormous, the government could take care, even excessive care, absent 
any indemnification obligation. If so, indemnification could improve efficiency, in that the 
expectation of compensation for damages would reduce the inclination of such politically 
powerful third parties to impose excessive standards of risk or to prevent launches altogether.25  
In fact, the FAA has commented that “the assured availability of funds to compensate for loss is 
a significant element of public acceptability” (50 Fed Reg 19281).   
Given those qualifications, one needs to be cautious in drawing conclusions from our 
model.  We have shown that under a rule in which the launch company is exposed to liability 
below some limit and the government covers the residual liability above that limit, under 
reasonable assumptions regarding the substitutability of one’s care for the other’s and the effect 
of care on the likelihood of high-damage accidents, the rule will lead to suboptimal care, with 
both parties perhaps exercising less care than would be efficient.  In theory, a straightforward 
negligence rule, under which the government fully indemnified the launch company if and only 
if the latter exercised due care, would lead to a better outcome.   
                                                 
24 This conception of the government actor as an agent with multiple principles comes from Peltzman (1976). 
25 For a similar result in the context of regulatory takings, see Brennan and Boyd (2006, 195–96). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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But before rejecting the current practice, a number of additional considerations should be 
kept in mind.  First, the feasibility of a negligence rule presupposes that determining whether the 
launch company failed to exercise due care can be done accurately.  Second, even if launch 
companies act with sufficient care to avoid liability, each launch nevertheless creates a positive 
expected third-party harm that the launch company will not internalize, leading to too many 
launches.  Third, the indemnification policy also reallocates risk between the launch company 
and the government, and the benefits of that risk reallocation may outweigh the expected costs 
from suboptimal care.  Fourth, the parties, particularly the launch company, may have little 
discretion regarding care levels because of regulations in place.  Finally, the likelihood of launch 
accidents with effects beyond the MPL may be so slight that for all practical purposes, the 
operational part of the policy is primarily that of requiring launch companies to insure against 
losses below the MPL, to protect against the possible inability of the launch company to cover 
losses after an accident, e.g., due to bankruptcy (Shavell 2006, 26–27).  
4. Conclusions 
Commercial space launches in the US feature indemnification rules that effectively 
divide liability for launch accidents between the public and private sectors, based on the 
magnitude of the damage.  Under reasonable assumptions, such risk-sharing formulas reduce 
each party’s incentive to take care and can result in suboptimal care levels.  An optimal liability 
rule would indemnify the company if due care was undertaken, but not otherwise.  This 
approach, however, requires that the government accurately determine the care levels undertaken 
by the company.  If this determination is not possible, risk sharing may be a second-best policy 
choice.  Finding ways to define care ex ante and verify it ex post could, however, improve upon 
the current regime. 
Politics, and not economics, may also be the likely underpinning for the indemnification 
rules.  Indemnification may simply be a political pacifier for constituents under the flight path 
worried about the ability of launch companies to compensate them for possible damages.  
Considerations such as this suggest that care levels are likely influenced by more than potential 
liability for damages.  The government may take care in anticipation of political outcry from an 
accident.  Determining how liability rules interact with these other incentives is difficult, but this 
information could significantly influence whether and what type of shared liability rule should be 
adopted. 
Whether and how the government adapts the indemnification policy to plans for having 
commercial entities rather than the government carry out actual launches may provide additional Resources for the Future  Brennan, Kousky, and Macauley 
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information on the relative influence of political and economic rationales.  A recent development 
is “commercial spaceports.”  Some are located on federal launch ranges (Spaceport Florida 
Authority, the California Space Authority, and Virginia Space Flight Center) and must comply 
with federal safety requirements. Commercial spaceports not located on federal ranges (Alaska 
and potentially state-owned, inland facilities) have to comply with federal range standards and 
procedures, but the FAA will establish safety requirements and the site operator will be 
responsible for protecting public safety.26  Whether indemnification is to be extended to these 
activities is under consideration; our results argue against extension. 
Finally, more research is warranted on the often-thorny details of optimal design of 
liability rules, insurance, and safety regulations in situations where the government is co-
producing risk along with private entities.  Since terrorism risk is largely influenced by 
government activities, conditional on private entities’ undertaking certain standards of security, 
full indemnification of these losses may be warranted.  Determining what types of care should be 
undertaken may be difficult, especially since terrorism risk is constantly changing as terrorists 
respond to our actions.  Flood risk, another example, is co-produced by individual property 
owners, who make decisions about where to locate and how much mitigation to undertake; 
communities, which regulate floodplain development and building codes and undertake risk 
reduction measures for the community; and the federal government, which offers insurance and 
builds some structural protection measures.  Inducing optimal care levels in this environment is 
difficult at best.  Investigations to improve regulations in these settings would be useful 
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